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1 Introduction
When do sunspots matter in an international economy? This question is important in
the era of financial globalization. The ongoing financial globalization has been encouraged
by the reduction of capital controls in successfully industrialized countries that have been
participants in the international financial market only since the mid-1980s, such as East
Asian countries and regions.1 In an era of financial globalization, capital moves instantly
between countries, seeking advantageous opportunities for profits.
Due to the instantaneous movement of capital, a number of countries have often become
the victims of financial crises that were followed by serious economic downturns. Major
financial crises in the 20th and 21st centuries, such as the Latin American debt crisis in the
early 1980s, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the subprime loan crisis in the United
States in the late 2000s, seemed to occur even though major economic indices, such as growth
rates and inflation rates, were not unfavorable immediately before the crises. In particular, in
the 1980s and 1990s, many middle-income countries faced a sudden capital reflux followed by
a severe economic slump. The financial crises often seemed to be caused not by fundamental
variables but by human psychology in an international financial market. In other words,
sunspots or animal spirits do matter to the international economy.
In this paper, by developing a multiple country general equilibrium model, we demon-
strate that when individuals face financial market imperfections, the international economy
becomes unstable with respect to the allocation of input, and the production of final goods
becomes tenuous, both of which result from the movement of capital that is caused by the
social psychology of individuals and the sentiment of a financial intermediary.
Many researchers have emphasized the importance of expectations in understanding
macroeconomic phenomena. For instance, since Azariadis (1981) and Cass and Shell (1983),
1The acceleration of financial globalization in the mid-1980s is the second wave of the free movement
of capital between countries. By 1914, financial globalization had advanced such that capital moved freely
across borders, the level of which was never or barely achieved even in 1990. See Eichengreen (2003) and
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).
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it has been an accepted truth that, in a general equilibrium model, randomization of multiple
perfect foresight equilibria by agents’ psychology or “sunspots” create endogenous business
fluctuations. Therefore, in the literature on the endogenous business fluctuations that are
induced by sunspots, researchers have focused their studies on the indeterminacy of perfect
foresight equilibria, which is a suﬃcient condition for sunspots to appear.2
Meanwhile, Cass and Shell (1983) have also discovered that although equilibrium is
unique, it is possible that sunspots do matter when agents have heterogeneous expectations.
Our model is closely related to their seminal discovery in that sunspots do not originate from
the randomization of multiple equilibria but from heterogeneous expectations.
To the best of our knowledge, only Krasker (1984) directly follows the discovery of Cass
and Shell (1983) and deals with heterogeneous expectations in a general equilibrium set-
ting, although for sunspots to matter, heterogeneous expectations are important. Krasker
(1984) investigates an overlapping generations economy with production when individuals
have heterogeneous expectations about extrinsic uncertainty, and he clarifies how capital
accumulation is aﬀected by heterogeneous expectations. However, since the capital market
is perfect in Krasker’s model, heterogeneous expectations must then be irrational to be in-
corporated into Diamond’s overlapping generations model (Diamond 1965).3 By contrast,
in our model, since the international financial market is imperfect, we can incorporate into
a general equilibrium model rational expectations that are ex-post heterogeneous between
countries.
Our findings are as follows: When the international financial market is perfect, extrinsic
uncertainty does not matter to the real economy, implying that agents’ minds or the senti-
ment of the financial intermediary are not aﬀected by sunspots and thus the allocation of
economic resources is unique and Pareto optimal. Of course, the uniqueness and Pareto op-
2See for instance Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996), Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) for multiple equi-
libria induced by externality. See also Howitt and McAfee (1992) for multiple equilibria induced by friction
of search behavior.
3That is why he states that “[his] framework is, in fact, not quite a general equilibrium model.” Actually,
however, his framework is a general equilibrium model with irrational expectations.
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timality of allocation in a general equilibrium model with a perfect market is not surprising.
However, if the international financial market is imperfect, then sunspot events aﬀect agents’
minds as well as the sentiment of the financial intermediary, which cause instability in the
international economy.
Meanwhile, when an economy with an imperfect financial market is closed to the world
market, the allocation of production input is unique, while the distribution of output among
agents is aﬀected by extrinsic uncertainty. In other words, only inequality within a country
is subject to sunspot events.
The importance of financial market imperfections in understanding macroeconomic in-
stability has been emphasized ever since the seminal paper by Bernanke and Gertler (1989).4
However, only a few researchers have investigated endogenous fluctuations induced by sunspots
in a multiple country model with financial market imperfections. Hu and Mino (2009) deal
with a two-good, two-factor, two-country model with infinitely lived agents. They incor-
porate an international financial market as well as an international trade market into their
model. Diﬀering from our model, they provide a condition for local sunspots induced by the
randomization of multiple equilibria.
Even without incorporating financial market imperfections, very few papers deal with
endogenous business fluctuations with sunspots in a multi-country model, although there
are some exceptions including Nishimura and Yano (1993) and Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010).
Nishimura and Yano (1993) derive endogenous business fluctuations using a two-good, two-
factor, two-country model with infinitely lived agents. They focus on the relationship be-
tween international trade and business cycles. However, because an international financial
market is not incorporated in their model, they do not investigate the eﬀects of financial
globalization on the world economy. In contrast, Aloi and Lloyd-Braga (2010) establish a
model in which two countries are financially integrated, and they investigate how economic
volatility induced by labor market imperfections spreads to the other country.
4See also Boyd and Smith (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Aghion, et al. (1999) and Matsuyama
(2004, 2007).
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None of these articles consider heterogeneous agents within a country or heterogeneous
expectations between countries. Heterogeneous talents and heterogeneous expectations are
important in our model (as are financial market imperfections) for sunspots to matter.
This paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we provide a basic model. In section
3, we derive equilibrium and discuss both a perfect foresight equilibrium and a sunspot
equilibrium. In section 4, we discuss when sunspots do matter in the international economy
and consider the constrained optimality of the international economy. Concluding remarks
are presented in section 5.
2 Model
The international economy consists of N countries indexed by i (i = 1, ..., N), and it con-
tinues for two consecutive time periods. Each country consists of individuals who live for
two periods. As will be seen later, individuals are heterogeneous in their talents to create
consumption goods. There is a representative financial intermediary that is conducting busi-
ness in the international financial market. The financial intermediary accepts deposits from
individuals and loans financial resources to investors wherever they live. Each country is
ex-ante identical except that they may have diﬀerent rational expectations for the future
interest rate. The population in each country is normalized to one.
The time schedule related to agents’ decision-making is summarized in figure 1. Agents
are born at the beginning of the first period, and then E(r) is announced by the financial
intermediary or the domestic media, where E(r) is the mathematical mean of the future
interest rate.5 In our model, a mathematical mean of a random variable, X(ω), is computed
over sunspot events {ω}, where {ω ∈ Ω | X(ω) ≤ x} is an element of a σ-algebra F of a
fixed probability space (Ω,F , P ). If X(ω) is constant almost everywhere (a.e.) in (Ω,F , P ),
then it is a deterministic variable.
5Alternatively, we may assume that each individual computes E(r) with knowledge of our model. In the
main text, one could imagine, for instance, that a think tank could provide individuals with the information
about E(r).
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Once E(r) is announced, the international financial market is opened, but then a sunspot
event is observed. The sunspot event is reflected in agents’ minds. Then, in each country,
the country-specific expectation for the future interest rate, rie, is noted, and the investment
decisions are made by agents. At the end of the first period, the financial market is closed.
At the beginning of the second period, consumption goods are produced. Then, the
second sunspot event occurs, which aﬀects the sentiment of the financial intermediary and
r is fulfilled. The second sunspot event comes out of the same probability space as that of
the first sunspot event. The two sunspots are independent of each other. At the end of the
second period, each agent consumes all his income after repayments.
2.1 Individuals
In the first period, an agent in country i is born with an endowment w. He/she is risk-neutral
and he/she exclusively obtains his/her utility from his/her second period consumption. Be-
cause the endowment is perishable in one period, he/she will invest it in a project or deposit
it with the financial intermediary. If he/she wants to borrow financial resources from the
financial intermediary, the financial intermediary will lend him/her up to some proportion
of his/her initial wealth, namely, the financial intermediary imposes a credit constraint on
borrowing.
If an agent invests one unit of his/her endowment in a project in the first period, then
he/she will create φ units of consumption goods in the second period, where φ is the constant
marginal product of his/her investment. Meanwhile, if he/she deposits his/her endowment
with the financial intermediary in the first period, then he/she will obtain r units of con-
sumption goods in the second period, where r is the gross interest rate of his/her deposit.
When an agent makes a decision on how much he/she invests in a project or deposits in the
financial intermediary, he/she cannot generically observe the future interest rate r. There-
fore, he/she has an expectation of what the future interest rate will be when he/she has to
make a decision. We assume that the expectation for the future interest rate is identical
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between agents within a country, whereas it may vary between countries.
An agent in country i maximizes his/her expected consumption in the second period, cie,
subject to:
ki + bi ≤ w (1)
cie ≤ φki + riebi (2)
bi ≥ −ηw, 0 < η <∞. (3)
Inequality (1) is a budget constraint in the first period, where ki is an investment and bi is a
deposit if positive and a debt if negative. Inequality (2) is the budget constraint in the second
period, where rie is the expectation for the future interest rate. As mentioned above, if an
agent invests in a project, he/she creates consumption goods, whereas if he/she deposits
his/her endowment with the financial intermediary, he/she is repaid with interest in the
second period. If he/she borrows from the financial intermediary, then he/she has to repay
it with interest. He/she consumes all of the income in the second period. Inequality (3) is a
credit constraint. Following Aghion et al. (1999), Aghion and Barnergee (2005), and Aghion
et al. (2005), we assume that an agent can borrow financial resources from the financial
intermediary up to η times his/her initial wealth.6 As η increases, the credit constraint is
relaxed. In particular, if η goes to infinity, the financial market becomes perfect.7 It should
be noted that w and η are invariant between countries without being indexed by i.8
Now we introduce the heterogeneity for φ between individuals. φ has a uniform distri-
bution G(φ) whose support is [0, a] (a > 0), implying that G0(φ) = 1
a
if φ ∈ [0, a]. Lemma 1
below provides a solution for the maximization problem for individuals.
Lemma 1 (1) If φ < rie, then ki = 0 and bi = w. (2) If φ > rie, then ki = w
1−μ and
bi = − μw
1−μ .
6In the appendix, we provide a simple microfoundation for credit constraints along the same line of Antra´s
and Caballero (2009).
7In other words, in this case, each agent can borrow up to the natural debt limit.
8These assumptions can be relaxed by letting w and η be country-specific; however, the analysis would
then be complicated without any advantage for the claimed results.
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Proof: The maximization problem is rewritten as:
max
bi
(rie − φ)bi
subject to
− μ
1− μw ≤ b
i ≤ w,
where μ := η
1+η . From this problem, if r
ie − φ > 0, then it is optimal for an individual to
choose bi = w and ki = 0, whereas if rie− φ < 0, then it is optimal to choose bi = − μw
1−μ and
ki = w
1−μ . ¤
From lemma 1, we note that rie is the cutoﬀ that divides agents into savers and investors.
The (per capita) production of consumption goods in country i is given by:
Y it :=
Z a
rie
w
1− μφdG(φ) =
F (rie)
1− μ w, (4)
where F (rie) :=
R a
rie
φdG(φ) = 1
a
(a2− (rie)2). The per capita output is a decreasing function
of the expectation for the future interest rate.
2.2 Financial Intermediary
Because the international financial market is competitive, the representative financial inter-
mediary cannot profit from it. Because the financial intermediary does not have an initial
net worth, it only accommodates borrowers with loans and accept deposits from savers so
that the liabilities (which contain only the total deposit) and the assets (which contains only
the total loan) are balanced on its balance sheet. In the second period, it places the interest
rate at r so that the goods and financial markets clear. Let E(r) be the mathematical mean
of the interest rate. Then we obtain:
r = E(r) + ², (5)
where ² is the error term with mean zero. ² is F -measurable and is a continuous random
variable. The error term ² comes from the extrinsic uncertainty associated with the sentiment
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of the financial intermediary in the second period. We assume that ² is continuous in the
support [²L, ²H ] where ²L ≤ 0 ≤ ²H . We also assume that aμ+²L > 0 so that the equilibrium
interest rate r is always greater than zero. When ²L = ²H = 0, ², and thus, r become
deterministic variables. When it holds that ²L < 0 < ²H , ² is a random variable. Individuals
cannot observe the sentiment of the financial intermediary ² when they make decisions on
an investment.
2.3 Market Clearing Condition
Let Bi be the net foreign wealth held by country i in the first period. Bi is given by the
total saving minus the total loan in country. From lemma 1, we obtain:
Bi =
Z rie
0
wdG(φ)−
Z a
rie
μw
1− μdG(φ)
=
G(rie)− μ
1− μ w. (6)
We note from Eq.(6) that country i is a net borrower (creditor) in the international financial
market if and only if G(rie)< (>)μ.
Now suppose that all countries are financially integrated. Because the financial market
should clear across the countries, it always holds that
PN
i=1B
i = 0 or equivalently:
NX
i=1
G(rie) = Nμ. (7)
3 Equilibrium
If the financial intermediary sets a very high interest rate, then there is a possibility that
some borrowers may default and the financial market does not clear even though the financial
intermediary imposes credit constraints. We assume away this case, i.e., we assume that the
sentiment of the financial intermediary appears such that no one experiences bankruptcy.
In what follows to the end, we consider only rational expectations equilibria in the sense
that on average, the expectation for the future interest rate is equal to the actual interest
rate, i.e., E(rie) = E(r) before the sunspot events. In other words, individuals should not
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make systematic errors because they minimize E(r − rie)2, whose first-order condition is
given by E(rie) = E(r).
Definition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium in the international economy is expressed
by an interest rate r, the expectations for the interest rate {rie} i = 1, ..., N where E(rie) =
E(r) before the sunspot events, and allocation {ci, ki, bi} for each i and φ such that (i) for each
φ ∈ [0, a] in country i and given rie, {ki, bi} solves the maximization problems of individuals
and (ii) all markets clear such that there are no bankruptcies.
A perfect foresight equilibrium in which rie = r a.e. is a special case of a rational expectations
equilibrium.
3.1 Perfect Foresight Case
In this section, we derive an equilibrium in which all the agents have perfect foresight of the
future interest rate such that it always holds that rie = r a.e. for i = 1, ..., N .
Proposition 1 Suppose that all agents in the world have perfect foresight of the future
interest rate. Then, the interest rate is deterministic, implying that extrinsic uncertainty
does not matter to the real economy.
Proof: Since rie = r a.e., we have G(r) = μ⇐⇒ r = aμ a.e. from Eq.(7). This implies that
r is a deterministic variable and is determined by the economic fundamentals. Therefore,
extrinsic uncertainty does not matter to the real economy. ¤
In the case of perfect foresight, equilibrium is unique. We note from Eq.(6) that the net
foreign wealth in all the countries is zero, and they produce the same amount of consumption
goods. This is because they are perfectly symmetric. The international economy is stable
without being aﬀected by agents’ psychology or the sentiment of the financial intermediary.
3.2 Market Psychology and Business Fluctuations
Now, we relax the assumption of perfect foresight and investigate business fluctuations in-
duced by agents’ expectations. If we assume away the assumption of perfect foresight of
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the future interest rate, then it is possible that an infinite number of interest rates could
exist that support the equilibrium allocation of economic resources allocated in the first pe-
riod. To see this intuitively, we can aggregate the budget constraint in the second period in
country i:
C i = Y i + rBi, (8)
where the capital notations stand for the aggregate variables in country i. The aggregation
of Eq.(8) across the world yields:
NX
i=1
C i =
NX
i=1
Y i + r
NX
i=1
Bi. (9)
Because the international financial market should clear, it follows that
PN
i=1B
i = 0. This
means that the market clearing condition is independent of the world interest rate, r, once
the expectations of the future interest rate are confirmed at time t.
Meanwhile, there is an upper limit to the actual world interest rate, which is restricted
by a non-bankruptcy condition of borrowers.
Lemma 2 Given rie for i = 1, ..., N , the necessary condition for r to be an equilibrium
interest rate is that r ∈
TN
i=1[0,
rie
μ ].
Proof: Suppose that r > r
ie
μ for some i. Then, the income of the agents with φ ∈ (rie,μr)
at the second period is (φ − μr)k < (μr − μr)k = 0, which contradicts a non-bankruptcy
condition. ¤
We note that rie ≥ μr for all i. Lemma 2 tells us that there is no guarantee that the
expectation of the future interest rate is equal to the actual one, although all the agents know
the structure of the current model. This fact aﬀects the equilibrium allocation of economic
resources when the expectations of the future interest rate in each country are diﬀerent from
each other.
Now, we assume the expectation formation of the future interest rate. At the beginning
of the first period, each agent knows the mathematical mean of the interest rate E(r). One
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may think that private agents have been informed of E(r) by the domestic media or the
financial intermediary. At the time when the private agents contract with the financial
intermediary, they do not know the actual real interest rate of r, which will have been
accidentally determined in the second period due to extrinsic uncertainty.
Private agents in a country have expectations of the future interest rate based on E(r),
which is the only information on the future interest rate. Their expectation formation is
disturbed by country-specific noises in the first period. The formation of expectations of the
future interest rate is assumed as follows:
rie = E(r) + λi, (10)
where λi is the country-specific error term with mean zero, given the information in the first
period. λi is a continuous random variable, which is F -measurable. λi − ² expresses the
miscapture of the error term ².9
To derive E(r), we take a mathematical expectation for both sides of Eq.(7) and obtain
NE(r) = aNμ⇐⇒ E(r) = aμ. From this, we have:
r = aμ+ ² (11)
rie = aμ+ λi. (12)
Proposition 2 (1) If μ is suﬃciently close to one, then r = rie = a, implying that there
exists only a perfect foresight equilibrium. (2) If μ is suﬃciently close to zero, then rie = 0,
implying that there exists only an autarky equilibrium without a financial sector.
Proof: From lemma 2 and Eqs.(11) and (12), we obtain:
λi ≥ μ²− (1− μ)aμ. (13)
From Eq.(13), it holds that for i = 1, ..., N , λi ≥ limμ→1(μ² − (1 − μ)G−1(μ)) = ². Since
E(λi) = E(²) = 0, it must follow that λi = ² a.e. for i = 1, ..., N . Therefore, the case is
9One could assume that λi has the same distribution as that of ². In this case, we can say that individuals
know the exact distribution of the disturbance of the sentiment of the financial intermediary.
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one of perfect foresight, and thus, the first part of proposition 2 holds. For the second part,
because λi ≥ limμ→0(μ² − (1 − μ)aμ) = 0, λi must be a deterministic variable and is given
by λi = 0 a.e. for i = 1, ..., N , which leads to rie = 0 a.e. In this case, every agent in every
country creates consumption goods for him/herself. ¤
Regarding the first part of proposition 2, we intuitively say that when the international
financial market is perfect, the corner solution obtained in the maximization problem of
each individual is consistent with a unique allocation of the world economy, which is Pareto
optimal. However, when 0 < μ < 1, an equilibrium allocation of the world economy is not
Pareto optimal. In this case, as observed later, there exist the random variables of λi and ²,
which reflect agents’ psychology and the sentiment of the financial intermediary, respectively.
Henceforth, we focus our study on the case in which rie ≤ a. While rie could be greater
than a, it is only when rie is in [0, a] that the output of each country varies. This is because
if rie is greater than a, F (rie) is equal to zero. Investigating these cases makes our study
very complicated while the main points of our model remain unchanged.
Lemma 3
PN
i=1 λi = 0.
Proof: Substituting Eq.(12) into Eq.(7), we obtain aNμ+PNi=1 λi = aNμ. ¤
Lemma 3 implies that λi (i = 1, ..., N) can vary with the N − 1 degrees of freedom.
In particular, it follows from Eq.(6) that if λi > 0 (< 0), then country i is a net creditor
(borrower) in the international financial market. In the international financial market, it
is impossible that all of the countries become net creditors or borrowers. That is why the
degrees of freedom of {λi} are N − 1, not N . We also note from lemma 3 that if the
formation of rational expectations is homogeneous among countries, then it must follow that
λ1 = λ2 = ... = λN = 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose that 0 < μ < 1 and define λH := min{a(1 − μ), (N − 1)μ(a(1 −
μ) − ²H)}. If 0 < ²H < (1 − μ)a, then there exist both a random variable ² and random
variables {λ1, ...,λN} such that PNi=1 λi = 0 and the support for each λi is given by I :=
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[μ(²H − a(1 − μ)),λH ]. In particular, μ(²H − a(1 − μ)) and λH are the minimum and
maximum values that λi can take.
Proof: If 0 < ²H < (1−μ)a, we can construct a random variable such that the support of ²
is [²L, ²H ], where ²L < 0 < ²H . Because ²H−a(1−μ) is negative, we can let the lower limit of
the support of λi be μ(²H − a(1− μ)) such that for any realization of ², Eq.(13) holds. This
implies that the minimum value of λi for each i could be μ(²H − a(1− μ)). Pick any integer
j ∈ [1, N ]. Suppose that λi = μ(²H−a(1−μ)) for each i except for j. Then, it must hold that
λj = (N−1)μ(a(1−μ)−²H) becausePNi=1 λi = 0. If λj = (N−1)μ(a(1−μ)−²H) ≤ a(1−μ),
then it is the maximum value of λj. However, if λj = (N − 1)μ(a(1− μ)− ²H) > a(1 − μ),
then the maximum value of λj is a(1 − μ) because rie = aμ + λi ≤ a. (In this case, not all
of the λi (i 6= j) can take the value λi = μ(²H − a(1− μ))). ¤
From lemma 3, the random variables {λ1, ...,λN} are linearly dependent and the degrees
of freedom are N − 1. Their realizations should be on a subset of a hyperplane such that
{(λ1, ...,λN ) ∈ <N |PNi=1 λi = 0, μ(²H−a(1−μ)) ≤ λi ≤ λH for each i}. As stated above, for
the international financial market to clear, some countries will face capital inflow whereas the
other countries will experience capital outflow depending on the psychology of each country.
Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration when N = 3 and λH = (N − 1)μ(a(1− μ)− ²H .
When ²H is given such that the condition of proposition 3 is satisfied, μ takes a value in
(0, a−²
H
a
). An interesting question is at what value of μ |I| = min{−aμ2− ²μ+a,−Naμ(μ−
a−²H
a
)} is maximized. This question is related to the maximum amplitude of fluctuations of
the international economy.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ²H is given such that the condition of proposition 3 is satisfied
and μ is in (0, a−²H
a
). Then, the following should hold: (1) If N(a− ²H)2 ≤ 3a2+(²H)2, then
|I| is maximized at μ = a−²H
2a
and (2) if N(a− ²H)2 > 3a2 + (²H)2, then |I| is maximized at
μ = aN−²H(N−1)−4
√
a2(N−1)
2(N−1)a .
Proof: Let f(μ) := −Naμ(μ − a−²H
a
) and g(μ) := −aμ2 − ²μ + a. The maximum of
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f(μ) is attained at μ = a−²H
2a
. Therefore, if f(a−²
H
2a
) ≤ g(a−²H
2a
), i.e., if N(a − ²H)2 ≤
3a2 + (²H)2, then |I| is maximized at μ = a−²H
2a
. Meanwhile, if f(a−²
H
2a
) > g(a−²
H
2a
), then |I|
is maximized at the smaller solution of the quadratic equation, f(μ) = g(μ), which is given
by
aN−²H(N−1)−4
√
a2(N−1)
2(N−1)a , because g(μ) is decreasing in (0, a−²Ha ). ¤
In either case of proposition 4, it is implied that when credit constraints are very severe
or very weak, the international economy is not so unstable, in the sense that the possible
amplitude of λi is small. However, when credit constraints are at an intermediate level,
the international economy is very unstable. The case of two countries provides us with a
simple illustration for proposition 4. In the two countries, λH = μ(a(1 − μ)− ²H) and thus
|I| = 2μ(a(1− μ)− ²H)=aμ(μ− ²H−a
a
). We note that |I| takes its maximum at μ = a−²H
2a
.
4 Discussion
4.1 When do sunspots matter?
We have found that when μ is suﬃciently close to one and thus the international financial
market is perfect, sunspots do not matter, implying that ² and λi (i = 1, ..., N) are constantly
zero. In this case, accordingly, we obtain only a perfect foresight equilibrium. We have also
found that when μ = 0, sunspots do not matter. In this case, no agents lend from or deposit
financial resources with the financial intermediary, and they have to create consumption
goods on their own.
Another interesting case is the one in which a country is a closed economy and the
representative financial intermediary is a domestic company. In this case, we haveG(rie) = μ,
which means that λi = 0 a.e. and rie is a deterministic variable. Therefore, in the case of
a closed economy, there is no instability in the aggregate output or consumption. However,
we should note that the sentiment of the financial intermediary is still aﬀected by sunspot
events and thus ² could be a random variable. This implies that as long as the financial
market is imperfect, a distribution problem of output remains. In other words, sunspots
matter to inequality within a country, while they do not matter to the aggregate output or
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to the aggregate consumption.
4.2 Social Planner within a Country
In this subsection, we consider ex-ante and ex-post constrained optimalities within a country.
Suppose that a benevolent social planner within a country i can only choose rie, namely,
he/she cannot command any transactions in the financial market or identify the most capable
agents in his/her country. The social planner assigns an equal weight to the utility of each
individual and is interested in maximization of the aggregate utility in his/her country, which
is given by
R a
0
cidG(φ) = F (rie)
1−μ w + r
G(rie)−μ
1−μ w.
First, we consider the ex-ante optimality. Suppose that the social planner within a
country solves the maximization problem such that:
max
rie
E[F (rie) + r(G(rie)− μ)].
Then, the solution is given by E(rie) = E(r).
While the solution E(rie) = E(r) has been obtained because the heterogeneous agents
are uniformly distributed, it is consistent with the assumption of the expectation formation
of the future interest rate in the main text. However, we should note that the ex-post
optimality cannot be guaranteed once ² is fulfilled. If the social planner knew how to achieve
², the ex-post optimal solution would be obtained, which is given by λi = ². Of course,
this is a case of perfect foresight. In our model, agents cannot know the sentiment of the
financial intermediary when they make a decision on investment, although they might know
the distribution of ².
In the usual macroeconomic model, the formation of rational expectations is homoge-
neous, implying that λ1 = λ2 = ... = λN = 0 and thus rie = aμ. In other words, in the usual
macroeconomic model, we assume that rie = E(r). This expectation formation is a subset
of our expectation formations and generically yields an ex-post suboptimulity. While the
expectation formations associated with E(rie) = E(r) also yield an ex-post suboptimulity,
these expectation formations are rational because individuals do not make systematic errors.
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By contrast, in the case in which the financial market is perfect, the optimality before
sunspot events coincides with the one after sunspot events, because it holds that λi = ² = 0.
Therefore, the expectation of the future interest rate is independent of a country-specific
disturbance.
4.3 Social Planner in the World
Suppose that a benevolent social planner can choose every λi or equivalently every rie subject
to
PN
i=1 λi = 0. As in the previous case, however, he/she cannot command any transactions
in the financial market or command production of each individual in the world.
A benevolent social planner assigns an equal weight to each individual in the world and
maximizes the aggregate utility:
NX
i=1
F (rie)
1− μ w,
subject to
PN
i=1 λi = 0. We can easily obtain the solution for this problem, which is given
by λ1 = λ2 = ... = λN = 0. This solution is intuitive, namely, because all countries
are symmetrical, that is, all the psychological disturbances should be equal to zero for the
constrained optimality of the world economy.
We should note that this maximization problem is independent of the sentiment of the
financial intermediary. Therefore, in the constrained optimality, the social planner does not
care about the distribution problem of output. This is because each individual is risk-neutral
with respect to consumption. If the utility function is strictly concave, the constrained
optimality is subject to the sentiment of the financial intermediary. In this case, by comparing
the marginal utilities among individuals, we hypothesize that some positive ² will produce
the constrained optimality. This is because ² plays a role as a tax rate on the income of rich
investors and a subsidy rate on the income of poor savers. If the utility of each individual
is strictly concave, then the greater equality among individuals will result in the greater
aggregate utility in the world.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In the era of financial globalization, economic booms and busts should be considered from the
perspective of capital movement. This is because capital inflow and outflow often significantly
determine the economic situation of a country, as evident by the many financial crises in
20th and 21st centuries.
In this paper, we have demonstrated that if the international financial market is imperfect,
then an economic boom backed by capital inflow will be fragile given the social psychology in
the international financial market and the sentiment of the representative financial interme-
diary. This is because if the international financial market is imperfect, there are infinitely
many world interest rates that can support the equilibrium allocation of economic resources
and because agents’ rational expectations of the future interest rate can waver. Depending
upon the interaction among country-specific expectations, some countries experience capital
inflow followed by an economic boom, whereas other countries face capital outflow followed
by an economic downturn, although they are completely symmetrical before sunspot events.
Our model can be extended to an overlapping generations model. By doing so, we
can engage in more intricate discussions about international business fluctuations caused by
sunspot events. The reason why we have investigated a simple two-period model in this paper
is that we need to avoid the inherent suboptimality of an overlapping generations model.
Otherwise, although sunspots do matter in the international economy, we cannot clarify
whether the instability due to sunspots comes from the suboptimality of an overlapping
generations model or from financial market imperfections. Now that we have understood that
sunspots do matter in the international economy because of financial market imperfections,
we can proceed to modeling with overlapping generations. This is a topic for future research.
18
Appendix
Microfoundation for credit constraints
We extend a microfoundation for credit constraints developed by Antra´s and Caballero (2009)
to the one that is applicable to our economy. To establish the microfoundation, we need to
consider a participation constraint of the financial intermediary and incentive compatibility
constraints of borrowers such that they do not default.
We impose two assumptions on the behavior of borrowers (entrepreneurs). First, suppose
that at the end of the first period, any borrower can back out of his/her investment project
at no cost before he/she starts to produce consumption goods but after investment has
occurred, taking a part of his/her investment (1 − μ)(w − bi) where 0 < μ < 1 and not
repaying his/her obligation to the financial intermediary. In this case, he/she will produce
consumption goods on a deserted island. Second, after the second sunspot, if a borrower
would like to default, i.e., does not repay the financial intermediary, he/she can take a part
of his/her production (1 − μ)φ(w − bi) and incur a cost −crbi > 0 where 1 − μ ≤ c ≤ 1.
One can imagine that the cost has to be paid to a person in an illegal business who helps
the borrower walk away.10
If a borrower walks away at the end of the first period, then the financial intermediary
can take back the amount of the remainder of the investment, μ(w−bi). We assume that the
financial intermediary can lend the remainder of the investment in the financial market again.
Therefore, when the financial intermediary makes a financial contract with a borrower, it
faces a participation constraint such that:
E(r)μ(w − bi) ≥ −E(r)bi,
or equivalently11
bi ≥ − μ
1− μw. (14)
10We note that if the borrower takes all his/her output (μ = 0), the cost is equal to his/her total obligation.
11In equilibrium, we note that E(r) = aμ > 0 unless μ 6= 0.
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In contrast, the incentive compatibility constraint for a borrower not to back out of
his/her project at the end of first period is given by:
φ(w − bi) + riebi ≥ φ(1− μ)(w − bi). (15)
If rie − μφ ≤ 0 for any realization of rie, then this inequality always holds. Therefore, we
focus on the case in which rie − μφ > 0 for some realization of rie. In this case, inequality
(15) is rewritten as:
bi ≥ − μ
(rie/φ)− μw. (16)
Meanwhile, the incentive compatibility constraint such that a borrower does not walk
away after the second sunspot is given by:
φ(w − bi) + rbi ≥ φ(1− μ)(w − bi) + crbi. (17)
If it follows that (1− c)r−φμ ≤ 0 for any realization of r, then this inequality always holds.
Thus, we focus on the case in which (1 − c)r − φμ > 0 for some realization of r. Then,
inequality (17) is rewritten as:
bi ≥ − μ
(1− c)(r/φ)− μw. (18)
In what follows, we will demonstrate that the participation constraint (14) is a suﬃcient
condition for the incentive compatible constraints (16) and (18), i.e., inequalities (16) and
(18) are redundant if we have the participation constraint (14).
In equilibrium, because rie/φ ≤ 1, it follows that − μ
(rie/φ)−μ ≤ −
μ
1−μ , implying that
inequality (16) is redundant. In contrast, it follows that (1−c)rφ ≤
μr
φ ≤
rie
φ ≤ 1. The second
inequality follows from lemma 2. Thus, we have − μ
(1−c)(r/φ)−μ ≤ −
μ
1−μ , and inequality (18)
is redundant.
To summarize, if the financial intermediary imposes a credit constraint bi ≥ − μ
1−μw,
which is the participation constraint of the financial intermediary, borrowers never default.
By letting μ
1−μ := η, we obtain a credit constraint bi ≥ −ηw in the main text.
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